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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation:
Development of Security Measures on Board Ships:
Guidelines for Egyptian Seafarers.

Degree :

MSc

A comprehensive assessment of the potential risks that the merchant vessels face from
piracy, stowaway and maritime terrorism need to be addressed. To the extent that the
administrations begins a serious effort to tighten security on board their ships, the
long-term interests of sea travel will be better served. Without the will to make
preventive measures against attack, ships everywhere will remain at the mercy of
these maritime threats.
Piracy has always been an ocean hazard. Over the years the use of firearms has
increased. With the aid of modern technology and the involvement of organized
syndicates, piracy has become even more violent. It has become evident, that the
targets are carefully chosen and that the pirates are well-informed about the nature of
the cargo carried and the level of security to expect.
Stowaways present an immense problem that encompasses the entire globe. Fear of
political discrimination, civil war or natural disasters or a simple wish to have a better
standard of living are reasons for more and more people using ships as an illegal
means to enter a foreign country which costs the shipping industry million of dollars a
year.
Maritime terrorism is the most serious threat facing any vessel and crew today. The
threat against passenger ships is increased by the displacement of terrorist attacks
from the aviation system where preventive security has reduced their opportunity for
success. It consists of any act which maliciously damages or destroys property,
frightens or kills innocent crew or passengers. It is included as part of the basic
doctrine of most revolutionary groups throughout the world risking their lives usually
for political reasons.
It can be emphasized that the most valuable factor in the protection of the ship is the
willing, knowledgeable and cooperative attitude of the crew. To gain this valuable
target however does take an effort and there needs to be a security measures
guideline. This dissertation provides reasonable and pragmatic steps aimed at
achieving this goal.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Background to the study
In these days, lamentably, merchant vessels represent convenient means of transport
to the stowaway and easy prey for pirates and terrorists. It is astonishing that in an
era of sophisticated technology and multi-media communication, problems like
piracy, stowing away and terrorism are more than nuisances to the maritime industry,
but represent strategic threats to it.

Anyone who reads any maritime journal will realize that piracy is not a historic or
romantic fiction. Over the years the use of firearms has increased, organized
syndicates have taken over and the severity of the attacks increased. Today’s ships,
with their high-value cargo and small crews to man the ships that carry them, are
vulnerable to criminal predators in high speed boats, communications equipment and
weaponry, and operating in sea lanes that international carriers must traverse. From
the report of the 71st session of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) (1999/5), the
total number of incidents reported to the International Maritime Organization (IMO),
since it started compiling statistics on these unlawful acts in 1984, had amounted to
1455 by the end of April 1999 and, although their number had dropped in 1998 by
17% compared with that for 1997, it noted with particular concern that, during the
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period under review, 51 crew members had reportedly been killed and another 31
had been wounded. The plague seems to be largely unchecked with no punishment
despite the efforts of IMO and other organizations such as IMB (International
Maritime Bureau) and BIMCO (The Baltic and International Maritime Council).
Perhaps more disturbing are instances of possible state sponsorship.

It has become evident that the targets are carefully chosen and that the pirates are
well informed about the nature of cargo carried and the level of security to expect.
There are cases of whole cargo being unloaded at sea. Occasionally, crew have been
killed, ships have been renamed and spirited away, to become what is known as
“Phantom Ships”. Another evil face of the coin is that piracy affects maritime traffic
in vital shipping lanes, such as the Malacca Strait which is one of the heaviest traffic
lanes of the world used by up to 200 ships daily; attacks on oil supertankers increase
the potential of igniting environmental disasters (as vessels are left unmanned during
the attacks in those narrow waterways).

In the days of sail, stowaways were sometimes a welcome supplement to the crew,
particularly on the homebound voyage when some seamen had fallen sick, died or
stayed behind for other reasons. When the shortage became acute, the master sent out
specialists to “shanghai” men, that is to make them drunk and bring them on board
and, when sober they found themselves at high seas. Today there is no need to
shanghai people, to make them drunk and press them to work on a ship. Today they
come voluntarily and in numbers as stowaways, refugees or asylum seekers. They
need not to be paid because they are on board for one purpose only, to travel to a
country of their choice. For this some of them have even paid money to organized
gangs.

It seems a romantic notion and harmless to stow away and to travel between
continents free and easy. In reality it involves a grave risk to the stowaway himself,
in addition to a danger to the crew, the cargo and at times the ship - starting from,
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accidentally starting a fire due to a lighted cigarette dropped in the cab of a truck, to
causing major delays to ships because of repatriation procedures. In the past two
years, stowaways have cost the Protection & Indemnity Association (P&I club) US $
1.8 million. Time wasted is greater if a stowaway claims that he was mistreated on
board or has been robbed. Investigation in those cases is extremely lengthy. Many
stowaways are thieves, looking to steal cargo and ‘jump’ ship at the next port.
Stowaways are not harmless as some think, they are often violent, desperate and can
be a great threat to the crew, as they may carry guns or even drugs as their passport
to a ‘new life’ elsewhere. Oftentimes they may also carry drugs as ‘tickets’ they pay
to organized drug smuggling syndicates for making them travel.

Maritime terrorism is not a new phenomenon and arguably not a dramatically
growing one. It has been adjunct to political and quasi – military campaign for more
than a century, (like the case which occurred at the very outset of the rise of
contemporary terrorism in January 1968, where the Pueblo, a US Navy intelligence
ship was captured off the North Korean coast by a North Korean patrol boat.).
Afterwards, the number of reported incidents demonstrate some growth from decade
to decade. Today, maritime terrorism precisely mirrors other forms of terrorism in
that about 85% of incidents involved bombs or other explosives. It also craves media
attention, and the seizure of the Achillee Lauro in October 1985 – an Italian vessel
wherein 800 passengers and 300 crew members were captured and an American
passenger was killed – provided the world with a graphic picture of maritime
terrorism. Today terrorists are trained in physical conditioning, weaponry,
electronics, communication, explosives, camouflage, first aid, document forgery,
martial arts, and military tactics.

Maritime terrorism represents a great harm not only to the industry or tourism, it can
even damage a nation’s economy. The official Greek Government figures following
the single murder of the Achillee Lauro revealed a direct loss of $ US 300 million;
$200 million from tourism and $ 100 million from cancelled cruise ship bookings.
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Criminal activity in the form of piracy, stowaway or terrorism is quickly becoming
one of the greatest threats to the maritime industry and it simply cannot be
underestimated. This makes for an incontrovertible case that ship managers and
masters should take measures to improve the standards of security on their ships.

1.2 The need of improving the security measures of Egyptian seafarers

As in other matters, there is a great deal of difference between states concerning the
implementation of security measures on board their ships. Indeed, within the country
itself, one can find variance in the way different shipping companies apply security
standards aboard their ships. As a matter of fact, such security standards are
practically set in most part by the ship’s crew. That is why seafarers constitute a
dynamic element in security measures on board ships. Seafarers represent a
fundamental factor in ensuring security aboard ships in the Egyptian fleet where, in
accordance to national legislation, at least 90% of the crew must be Egyptian.

The primary goal of this dissertation is to provide Egyptian seafarers with useful
insights on the preventive measures which can be implemented on board Egyptian
vessels as well as guidelines on actions to be taken when those threats become a
reality on board. This author believes that there is an urgent need to improve security
measures on board Egyptian ships for the following reasons:

1- Even though Egypt is moving towards the improvement of maritime matters in all
perspectives, the “Egyptian MARAD” needs adequate security measures guidelines
to be implemented on board Egyptian ships (Maritime Administration in Egypt is the
responsibility of five maritime transport agencies under the Ministry of Transport.
For purposes of this dissertation, it will suffice to use the label “Egyptian MARAD”
when referring to the whole system or network of maritime administration in Egypt).
This dissertation hopes to fill in some of the gaps that may be found in the Egyptian
MARAD’s policies on maritime security.
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2- Security measures always make sense, regardless of a sea area’s reputation of
being pirate-infested or not. Egypt, for instance, is not considered a piracy-prone
area. In fact, only a single accident was reported last year (1998), where the crew of
an Egyptian fishing vessel attacked a Cyprus fishing vessel while fishing some 25
nautical miles (n.m) off the coast of Egypt, in international waters. In that particular
case, no murder was committed and the financial damage was estimated to be
minimal. The incident certainly cannot be considered as the beginnings of a new
phenomenon. Precautions, nevertheless, must be taken. It is meaningless to wait for
the problem to dominate before resolving it. Another reason for adopting preventive
measures is indeed because Egyptian vessels are not anchored permanently in
Egyptian waters. They are underway in the high seas, passing through dangerous hot
spots of piracy.

3- In spite of the fact that Egypt is not considered a place where illegal boarding is a
major problem, preventive measures should be taken seriously especially since costs
associated with stowaways can be very high. The total cost for 5 days of hiring a
security agency following the discovery of a stowaway on board an American vessel
can be in excess of $ 13,400. The invoice details vary depending on security on
board, removal of stowaway to hotel, security at the hotel, to hotel expenses, food
and beverages and travel expense per mile (BIMCO Bulletin, 98, p56). While such
invoices could hurt a shipping company in a country like the United States, it could
be an economic disaster for a shipping company in a developing country like Egypt.
The threat from stowaways is not only the expenses but also the potentially grievous
consequences of their presence. Fines, delays, emotional stress, and even criminal
charges against the crew for mistreating stowaways face owners and masters who do
not implement an effective plan to prevent stowaways from coming on board and to
care for the ones that do.

4- While there are no cases of maritime terrorism on record in Egypt, there are
numerous incidents of terrorism recorded on land. One of the most recent ones
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occurred in November 1997 when Egyptian terrorists shot and stabbed to death 58
tourists on a harmless visit to Queen Hatshepsut’s temple at Luxor (the Luxor
massacre may have been a last, savage attack by an illdisciplined group in decline,
although in the previous year 18 Greek tourists were also gunned down in Cairo).
Fortunately, no major terrorist incidents have occurred since then. This can be
partially attributed to the fact that Egyptians now provide top security for tourists.
Nonetheless, vigilance, training and all preventive measures should always be kept at
the highest levels in both maritime and shore-based industries basically for two
reasons. Firstly, it cannot be denied that tourism is one of the sectors first affected by
terrorism. With tourism being one of Egypt’s top foreign currency earners, bringing
in $ 3 to 4 billion a year (The Economist, March 1999, p6), it is evident that
disruption due to terrorism would cause serious problems. One in seven Egyptians is
said to depend in one way or another on the industry tourist. Accordingly, when
tourism crashes, the consequences are dire. Secondly, dues from ships passing
through the Suez Canal bring $ 2 to 3 billion a year. If a major maritime terrorism
incident were to occur in Egypt, the consequent desertion by tourists coming to see
Egypt’s sites and vessels planning to transit the Suez Canal, could cause a
developing country like Egypt foreign currency losses of that up to $ 5 to 7 billion a
year. The consequences could be economically disastrous.

1.3 Methodology

This dissertation’s main objectives are to dissect three of the most violent threats to
security at sea – piracy, stowaways, and terrorism – and recommend measures to
prevent and control these threats aboard Egyptian vessels. The methodology adopted
by this dissertation is to assign each threat a chapter of its own, with each chapter
beginning with a detailed examination of the threat and concluding with
corresponding recommended security measures. Preceding the chapters on the three
threats, however, is a chapter (Chapter 2) on the general principles of maritime
security.
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Chapter 2 will demonstrate the principles and objectives of maritime security. In this
chapter, discussions will be included on how the security planner can accomplish a
security survey as well as develop and maintain an appropriate ship security plan.
Different factors that affect the security plan shall also be analyzed. Chapter 2 is
designed to provide the reader the necessary foundation on the general principles of
maritime security and security planning. This prepares the reader for the more
detailed recommendations contained in the chapters on the three maritime security
threats.

Chapter 3 will be on piracy. It gives a general idea of the worldwide piracy threat as
well as the different tactics employed by pirates. Hot piracy spots are reviewed as
well as the location of the vessel during the attacks. A comparison is then made
between different kinds of seizures according to their duration. This chapter also
investigates the numerous countermeasures available to the shipping community by
way of general precautions and different antiattack plans when a vessel is in port,
underway or in high-risk areas. Guidelines on what could be done if attackers are
detected or worse if they gain access and control, are also offered. Chapter 3 ends by
providing procedures to be taken by officers and crew after an attack.

Chapter 4 deals on the issue of stowing away by first looking at how it is defined in
the maritime community. The chapter then examines behavioral patterns exhibited by
stowaways and offers suggestions on how to treat these “uninvited guests” once they
are discovered aboard ship. The chapter ends by proposing measures aimed at
providing ships with their first line of defense against the problem of stowaways, that
is, by preventing illegal boarding from taking place.

Chapter 5 is about terrorism at sea. It begins with a discussion on terrorism in
general, then focuses on maritime terrorism, its history, definition, and reasons why
terrorists might prefer the maritime environment as a venue for their activities.
Afterward, a scope on maritime terrorists, who they are, how they act, and their aims

7

are shown. Finally, preventive measures are established with an assessment of
suspicious passengers and proposed actions to be taken by the crew if terrorists gain
entry to the ship.

The sixth chapter will be the conclusion, where the major themes of the dissertation
are reviewed and recommendations provided for formulating national policies
against threats to maritime security on board Egyptian vessels are put forward.
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CHAPTER 2

Development of Security Measures on board ships

2.1 Security aims and principles

Merchant Shipping is an international industry. It provides an invaluable service to
society transporting goods and commodities across the world. Unfortunately,
however, merchant vessels also present a convenient means of transport for the
stowaway or drug smuggler and easy prey for the contemporary pirate and maritime
terrorist equipped with modern communications, equipment, and weaponry.

Although no vessel is capable of completely eliminating these risks, careful planning
can substantially reduce a vessel’s exposure. B.A.H. Parritt in his book Security at
Sea highlights one of the major problems in security planning:
whereas there are a multitude of SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) regulations
concerning safety, there are no …international laws… dealing with security.
All shipmasters well understand that, in order to fulfil their safety obligations,
they have to meet clearly defined and well-known safety standards and this
they do an internationally recognized standard. But when trying to fulfil their
security obligations, in the absence of clearly defined and internationally
agreed…laws of the sea, there has been a great deal of divergence and many
different standards.
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Maritime security can be defined as those measures employed by owners, masters
and administrators of ships to protect against different kinds of threats. Proper
maritime security creates a condition, which establishes and maintains certain
protective measures. These measures must be capable in all instances of performing
two absolutely imperative tasks. They must provide timely and accurate warning of
an impending threat and they must be capable of removing or neutralizing that threat.

2.1.1 The security objectives

The two objectives of maritime security are, therefore, adequate warning and timely
reaction. Adequate warning is essential to timely reaction. Without such warning, a
threat potentially becomes an attack and the ship’s ability to successfully repel that
attack is substantially reduced. On the other hand, the ability to react in a timely
manner to a security threat is just as important as the ability to provide adequate
warning. Neither is more important than the other, and both of them can only be
achieved through proper security indoctrination and training of personnel.

2.1.1.1 Adequate warning
This objective is governed by two security principle awareness and planning
Awareness means that each crewmember must care about the safety and security of
the ship. CARE stands for:

C concentrate

A always

R remember

E enemies

By caring, by concentrating, by remembering at all times that the ship is potentially
at risk, crew increase their awareness of security and their ability to give adequate
warning of any suspicious activity or circumstances. Planning means that each ship
must have a security plan that has been carefully and thoroughly prepared and
analyzed. This plan include the security standard operation procedures (SOPs),
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contingency plans, and personal assignments that are act designed to meet the
security threat applicable to that particular entity.
Awareness and knowledge can only be gained through proper indoctrination and
training such as security drills.

2.1.1.2 Timely reaction
To achieve this goal preparedness and action policy must be studied. A ship’s ability
to react in a timely manner to any security threat is determined by its level of
preparedness. Preparedness is a function of awareness and planning. It is the result of
proper training and indoctrination of personnel. Action is always governed by the
means of company and ship policy which is prepared to make a ship take action
against threats or react in such a way as to prevent the boarding of these threats.

2.1.1.3 Security in depth
The purpose of maritime security is to make access to the ship so difficult as to
discourage the attempt and, if the attempt is made, to minimize damage and ensure
the attempt remains an attempt. One way of doing this is to ensure that the security
should be in depth. In depth security establishes multiple security perimeters or line
of defense through which an attack must penetrate.

For a merchant ship berthed in port, the first security perimeter would be the harbor
gate. The second line of defense would be the area between the harbor gate and the
ship where port security people may be located. The third security perimeter is the
ship’s hull and gangway. For a ship under way or at anchor, the ship’s hull is the
only line of defense before an attack.

The two objectives of maritime security combined with the axiom that the security
should be in depth form a plan for security which can be diagrammed as shown in
figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1 Plan of maritime security

Maritime Security

Defence in Depth

Adequate Warning

Awareness

Timely Reaction

Planning

Preparedness

Action

2.2 Security risk

In the book ‘Ports at Risk’(1993), Eric Ellen, director of International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) –(IMB), states that “Security and risk are much used and abused
terms with the result that their variable meanings can become instilled in the mind of
the individual and yet not be totally correct in any given context.” Ellen declares that
risk is a term which implies a negative effect and can be defined as “Any potential
condition, which, if it were to become a fact, would adversely affect efficiency.”
From this definition it can be seen that there is an element of change in that the
potential may not come to pass even if no steps are taken to prevent it and the
parallel change that any preventive measures may not be effective.

On the other hand, Ellen defines security as “pertaining to crime or other deviant
behavior.” Those two definitions combine to give us a description of security risk as
being: “Any potential condition, having its basis in crime or other deviant behavior
which, if it were to become a fact, would adversely affect efficiency.”
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2.3 Security Planning

The aim of security planning is to develop valid and flexible plans. These plans must
be updated frequently to reflect the real shipping conditions that currently exist. A
plan that supposes things which are not reasonable or probable is flawed from its
inception. A plan must be usable today. The component concepts of security
planning are risk assessment, risk management, and application.

2.3.1 Risk assessment

A risk assessment is a rational and orderly approach and a comprehensive solution to
problem identification and probability determination. For security purposes on board
ship, the risk assessment process is used to establish whether any vessel is subject to
a higher level of risk due to specific circumstances. Information gathering and
monitoring is a vital part of this assessment process. Government and industry
bodies, together with local specialized groups, such as terminal operators and agents,
can provide a useful substantial source of information. Capt. John Evan in his article
“Repelling the Boarders” (1998) added that the Internet is another resource providing
information that involved attacks against ships and can, when appropriate, be passed
on to the master. Those factors to be taken into account in the risk assessment
process include the reported frequency and type of criminal activity prevalent in the
area the vessel is transiting or trading in or the freeboard, tonnage and speed of the
vessel; the nature of the cargo on board; and whether the vessel is required to anchor.

2.3.2 Risk management

Risk management is the anticipation, the recognition, and the appraisal of a risk and
the initiation of some action to remove or reduce that risk or to reduce potential loss
from that risk to an acceptable level. Effective planning against maritime security
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threats requires threat awareness, focused response and well developed contingency
plans. This also includes the proper training and equipment.

2.3.3 Application

The security plan can be prepared by a designated security officer or an independent
security consultant who for purposes of the plan is referred to as the security planner.
In the process of developing a security plan, a number of criteria should be carefully
considered, putting into account that these criteria vary from one instance to another.
Consequently, security plans will vary from one instance to another. The variables
rarely remain constant. Policy changes occur, capabilities change, risks fluctuate. A
vessel’s shipping route, ports of call, and security evaluation vary. Her new owners
will probably not agree with her old owners. The following includes a number of
criteria to be considered when developing a security plan:

1- Vulnerability to potential hazards
The security planner has to determine his ship’s potential vulnerability to various
security threats. To some extent a few of these hazards may be affected by the
geographical location of the ship. The stowaway threat certainly is. Piracy, too, is
fairly well confined to certain areas of the world at the present time. On the other
hand, sabotage and hijacking or terrorism can occur anywhere and may not be
significantly affected by the vessel’s location.

2- Effect of security measures on business
The operational budget is critical to any business enterprise, and the maritime
industry is no exception. The goal of all owners is to man their ships at a safe and
efficient level without having to incur “extraneous” expenses. Proper security
requires manning levels that in most cases will be higher than otherwise. If a ship is
operating with as few watch standards as possible, and as few watch rotations as
possible, no one will be available for security watches. Consequently, if the security
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needs of the ship are going to be met, the security planner must decide what security
measures to be adopted. In this regard he has three choices: he can try to utilize the
existing manning level and assign extra security duties to all crew members; he can
increase the manning level slightly and assign extra security duties to only some of
the crew; or he can increase the manning level substantially by employing security
personnel in addition to regular crew members.

3- Practical limitations imposed by the physical characteristics of the ship
The ship’s configuration will determine to a large extent the methods needed to keep
it secure.

4- Availability of Funds
The availability of funds is an important consideration when planning any security
program. Aboard ship, manpower cost and utilization is probably of the greatest
concern. Other factors include communications equipment, lights, weapons, alarms,
electronic surveillance equipment, and modification to the vessels.

5- Risk
The risk factor comes into play in two ways. First, a realistic assessment of the risk
faced by the ship must be made with regard to the various security threats. The
second way risk plays an important role in security planning is the degree to which
the vessel or its crew is placed at risk as a result of the security procedure employed.
One of the primary objections raised by owners against arming their ships is that this
will result in putting the crew at even greater risk. For instance, no owner considers it
acceptable to ask his ship’s crew to defend themselves against highly-organized and
powerfully-armed hijackers.

6- Alternative measures available
There are almost always alternative measures or procedures to any course of action,
and the security planner should consider all of them. He has to determine which

15

alternative procedures are desirable, if any, and whether they are more desirable than
the primary measures. For example, close circuit television (CCTV) systems can be
an alternative to manned security watches. Hoses can serve as an alternative to
firearms. Whether they are more desirable or not is the security planner’s decision.

7- Evaluation of the security capabilities of all available external resources
Certainly, the ship should be secure unto itself and be capable of providing for its
own security unassisted, but advantage can sometimes be taken of other available
resources. A shore-side facility may have its own security, which can assist in
securing the ships berth and respond to a security emergency. In some ports local
police and military may be willing to render security assistance. Customs and
Immigration officials may also provide information useful to the ship’s security.

2.4 The ship security plan

The main purpose of the ship security plan is to prevent unauthorized access to the
ship and its restricted areas. At its 53rd session in September 1986, shortly after the
hijacking of the ACHILLE LAURO, IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)
approved “Measures to prevent unlawful act against passengers and crew on board
ships” (IMO Doc. MSC 53/24 Annex 14) which applies mainly to passenger ships
engaged in international voyages of 24 hours or more and the facilities which serve
them. They also provide guidance on measures that could be applicable to all ports
and ships operations. Among others, the document contains recommendations
concerning the establishment of a ship security plan which shall provide for
measures and equipment as necessary to prevent the introduction of weapons on
board ship. Moreover, the measures also provide for the appointment of a ship
security officer responsible for the preparation and implementation of the appropriate
security plan.
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2.4.1 Consideration

The ship security plan must fulfil many functions. It is primarily designed to inform
all concerned of the details of the company’s corporate security policy and then
blend this company policy with the individual requirements of a particular ship. It
must also cover all the requirements of the IMO and relevant legislation. The
security plans also fulfil an important function in case of a terrorist or other violent
incident, when the plan may have to be presented before a board of inquiry. It is
therefore a document which has to be constantly amended and must accurately
reflect the actual security measures in force.

The ship security plan is a combination of the ship’s security SOPs and her security
bill. The security SOPs and security bill are developed on the basis of policy
decisions influenced to protect against the security threats faced by the vessel.

2.4.2 Factors affecting the degree of security required

The ship security plan should consider the factors affecting the degree and type of
security required by any ship. These factors include the ship’s size, the nature and
sensitivity of her cargo, the mission or types of services provided, the vulnerability of
equipment, the economic and political situations of the area involved, the proximity
of external support and the nature of that support, the capabilities of potential
attackers, and all shipboard activities in all geographical locations in which the ship
may find itself. The ship security plan should be of sufficient flexibility to allow for
different levels of security in the various ports of call, and it should establish
preventive measures for unlawful acts against the ship.
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2.4.3 Ship Security Plan Functions

IMO has established guidelines which spells out precise details of the ship security
plan, ship security officer, and security measures and procedures (Res.A.584(14)
paragraph 5 and Annex B paragraph 3). According to the IMO document, the ship
security plan should cover, among others, the followings:
•

function and responsibilities of the ship’s security officer

•

security bill and the duties assigned to the crewmembers

•

procedures of security standing operation procedures (SOPs) during all ship
board activities

•

maintaining and stowage of security equipment (for example, the locking
of ship firearms, the regular inspection of security lighting, and the
maintenance of security alarms and communication system)

•

means of maintaining integrity through strict access and egress controls and
identifications

•

establishment of IMO designated restricted areas

•

means of organizing security inspection security training and security drill
routine

•

coordination with port facility security officers or with port authority’s
designated representative for the vessel’s security.

2.5 Ship security survey

The purpose of the security survey is to ascertain the nature and scope of all security
threats. Because a security survey is conducted with regard to a specific ship, the
result of any two security surveys may not be alike. The methodology, however, of
conducting the survey should be the same. The survey should be organized in such a
way as to allow a complete and accurate analysis of all security weaknesses. That
analysis is then presented in the subsequent security report.
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The survey may be divided into two parts, the initial preliminary assessment and an
on-scene security survey. The establishment may be based on the IMO guidelines,
which is the product of collaboration among international experts in both government
and industry. In fact, in many ways, a security survey conducted aboard a ship is the
most difficult type of security survey. By its very nature, a ship presents continually
changing security environments during its voyage. At the same time she is usually
beyond reach of any outside security assistance while at sea.

The security officer must take into account as many possibilities as he can while
performing his survey. His security analysis must allow for virtually every
foreseeable maritime contingency. To do so the security officer must have a realistic
view of life and of the world in which we live. One thing he must always keep in
mind is that access control is the key to the security of a vessel. All of the ship’s
security procedures should be designed with one thought in mind – access control.

Once adopted, a copy of the resulting annual ship security report should be kept on
the ship and should be shown to the regulatory authorities as evidence of the way the
company is fulfilling its responsibilities.
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CHAPTER 3

Piracy attack

3.1 Introduction

Piracy has always been an undesirable part of maritime commerce. Although the
general public’s perception of piracy is often romanticized, there is a substantial
reality gap between the very false image and the hard fact. This fact is that piracy is a
real threat which is getting more and more violent. According to P.Mukundan,
director of ICC (IMB), a total of 86 attacks were recorded in the first 6 months of
1998, half of which involved violence and weapons. In March 1999 NUMAST
(Nation Union of Marine Aviation and Shipping Transport) asserted, “It is only a
matter of time before there is a serious incident involving loss of life or considerable
damage to the maritime environment.”

Since 1984, the total number of reported incidents of piracy has risen steadily, and
after a lull in 1993-94, there has been a sharp increase in the number of attacks
reported to the IMO until 1997.
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Figure 3.1
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According to the International Maritime Bureau’s annual report, acts of piracy and
armed robbery against merchant ships decreased in the last year (1998) to around 192
globally from 247 in 1997. However, the IMB warns that there is no reason for
complacency, citing that the 1998 figure may rise further as more details come in
over the next few months. IMB deputy director Capt Jayant Abhyankar stated in the
1999 IMO piracy seminar that, “Before, we thought that only about one in three
cases was reported. But after speaking to delegates here, I believe actual figures
could now be up to ten times greater.”

With this in mind, one needs to realize that many more attacks go unreported by
these reluctant owners and operators. In addition, there are many small fishing
vessels and coastal traders that are attacked which have no desire or capability of
reporting due to either official pressure or extortion. In many cases these small
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vessels are literally obliterated after the cargo is seized with no information as to the
fate of the crew.

There are a variety of reasons for under-reporting attacks. D. B. Stevenson, director
of seamen’s Church Institute‘s Center for seafarers right, captured the shipping
company’s sentiments when he wrote in BIMCO special bulletin 1998 that
“Reporting a pirate attack to local authorities can result in their detaining the vessel
for a lengthy investigation, sometimes requiring bribes to free the ship. Some
companies elect not to report piracy losses because they are afraid that reporting
them could damage their commercial reputation. In some cases losses due to piracy
are reported as other losses when insurance policies do not cover piracy losses.”
Stevenson also posits that local officials may discourage reporting piracy attacks in
an attempt to burnish their nation’s reputation and to protect their tourist industry.

3.2 Pirates today - how they act

The pirates of today are; as in yesteryears; ruthless, desperate criminals who often
will not hesitate to harm their victims. Attacks are often violent and injuries and
deaths occur all too frequently. Pirates today are more also determined than ever. At
Rio, a ship was twice boarded by armed pirates. At first, the attackers were initially
thwarted by the crew by locking all the doors. A while later, the attackers returned
with the appropriate equipment that finally enabled them to gain entry (IMB Piracy
Special Report, 1997). One IMB study expresses concern about the severity of the
attacks and has shown in Figure 3.2 and Table 3.3 the types of violent attacks
suffered by seafarers in 1998.

An IMO Seminar held in Singapore in 1999 re-iterated that in these days, piracy is
becoming more organized with international syndicates involved rather than spur-ofthe-moment acts by individual groups. They have shown considerable skill and
daring and have boarded ships traveling in excess of 17 knots and with high
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freeboard. They have demonstrated knowledge of ship’s procedures, often seeking to
board when bridge and engine room personnel are fully engaged in navigating
through congested or restricted waters, and knowledge of the general layout of the
ships they have attacked. They are better armed and ready to kill, in fact they adopt
all manners of weapons for assault. Table 3.1 shows the types of weapons used by
pirates.

Figure 3.2
Type of Attacks in 1998
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They always use small crafts coming from adjacent coastlines or being launched
from “mother” ships (larger vessel running without lights have occasionally been
reported in the vicinity of ships which have been attached). Those crafts, in most
cases, are even fitted with modern radar which enables them to see if they are being
followed.

Their tactics scarcely change. They come at high speed (if the ship is underway)
between 0100 and 0600 hrs, alongside the intended target usually from the stern or, if
the ship has low free board, from the side when it is fully laden. In ports, pirates
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sometimes use women (usually in Thailand) to gain intelligence from seamen
concerning the cargo and as diversionary tactic aboard ship. A number of reports that
came to the IMO reveal that pirates even employ more covert tactics such as
attempting to stop and board the ships wearing uniforms disguised as officials. The
70th session of MSC noted that on two occasions, pirates had used false distress
signals to deceive their victims.
Table 3.1
1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Grand
total

Unarmed

059

005

028

046

097

117

001

0353

Guns

001

018

029

017

039

032

068

0204

Knives

003

000

007

013

009

023

029

0084

Other weapons

042

029

002

006

033

054

022

0188

Unknown

000

004

037

008

010

002

109

0170

Total

107

106

103

090

188

228

229

1051

(Source: BIMCO special bulletin 1998)

Often the attackers will try not to alert the crew though they may take a crew
member hostage until the end of the attack. They may destroy the communications
equipment and then head for the crew’s quarter for personal possessions the master’s
safe for cash, or the containers where they can be very selective, revealing their
previous knowledge about the cargo manifest. Access to the ship will often be by
climbing up poles or grappling irons hooked on to the ship’s rail while it is underway
or by climbing up mooring ropes and anchor chains, or scaling the ship’s side from
small boats when the ship is at anchor.
3.3 Pirates: Their aim

Pirates’ aims vary from one extreme to another. They can be involved in the petty
theft of drums of paints, mooring ropes or other deck equipment within easy reach. If
the attackers are lucky and the bridge or the accommodation is not locked, it will be
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the bridge equipment or the crew’s valuables. P. Mukundan describes them as
‘maritime muggings’, where thieves board the vessel to steal whatever they can and
are easily frightened off by the crew. The other extreme extends from stealing the
captain’s safe, the cargo, part of it, all of it, or finally to the ship itself.

3.4 Pirates: Their target

All types of vessel can fall victim to act of piracy. Maritime piracy continues to rise
in profile worldwide. The estimated odds of attack are 1 in 1000 worldwide. The
worldwide average of reported attacks can be broken down as shown in table 3.2
Table 3.2
Tanker

26 %

Cargo Vessels

25 %

Bulk Carriers

17 %

Container Vessels

14 %

Miscellaneous Coastal Vessels

12 %

Fishing Vessels

06 %

(Source:http://usintel.com/counterpiracy, 5/1999)

3.5 Locations of attack

3.5.1 In port
In many countries and in some ports ordinary “bland” cargo port theft is endemic and
so inevitable as to become almost acceptable. Of course, “bland” theft is not always
the rule. Due to the increasing ferocity of pirates, attacks could involve violence even
to the extent of committing murder.
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3.5.2 At anchor
As Lloyd’s list reported in April 18 1998 “According to BIMCO, more than half the
incidents reported to BIMCO involve attack within port anchorage areas. This type
of attack is found where ships lie at anchor either to discharge or whilst waiting for a
berth. In such cases, the attackers require water capability in that they need to be able
to get to the ship.

3.5.3 When underway
The pirates who attack ships underway are disinterested whether a ship is within
territorial waters or not. With ships underway there is a sub-division of piracy type.
A distinction between short-term, long-term and permanent seizures can be made.

3.5.3.1 Short-term seizure
Pirates avoid boarding at the bow or amidships because they can be seen and loose
their element of surprise. The average length of time for any single incident is in the
region of thirty minutes. Violence is a possibility. However, there is more than one
recorded incident where the pirates have managed to board without being seen. They
have stolen the safe from its fitting in the master’s cabin and have left the ship
without being detected.

3.5.3.2 Long-term seizure
This is probably the type of incident that closely resembles the piracy of years gone
by. In these cases a ship is seized whilst underway, the crew are overpowered, and
the ship diverted from its course. The ship will be held for several days, during which
time the total cargo is unloaded, and after which the crew and the ship are finally
released. Such crime is never opportunist; it involves detailed planning and
organization. Moreover, according to IMB special report 1997 not only does such an
attack display a high degree of organization, but a measure of the impunity with
which it was carried out can be judged from the fact that one of the pirates, who

26

attacked M/V MARTA in 1990 by long-term seizure technique, said this was the sixth
such successful attack they had made in past eighteen months!
3.5.3.3 Permanent seizure
Permanent seizures were first highlighted in the Far East Regional Investigation
Team (FERIT) reports of the late 1970s and again by the IMB in the late 1980s
(IMB, 1997). These crimes are planned well in advance, with ships deliberately
targeted, usually for the value and easy disposal of the cargo. The attacks involve
highly trained pirate gangs, armed with submachine guns, boarding the vessel, after
killing the crew, with false ship’s papers, cargo papers and passports. The ship would
then be turned into a “phantom ship”. This is possible because of temporary
registrations issued indiscriminately by unscrupulous officials of some ship
registries. This means that a ship can be registered under several names with
different particulars, making the task of tracing a phantom ship very difficult. An
example of phantom ship was the ISLA LUZON that was renamed NIGEL. One
more recent example of a missing ship which had been turned into a “phantom” ship
is the CHEUNG SON which disappeared in the Taiwan Straits. The average life of a
“phantom” vessel before it is tracked down and arrested is two years, but during this
period the ship would already have been used as vehicles to transport and sell stolen
cargo, hide stowaways, and smuggle drugs.

3.6 Piracy victims

Crewmembers are the chief victims of piracy. This problem seems to be increasing
and the level of violence seems also to be rising. The 1998 BIMCO special bulletin
shows that each year an increasing number of crew members are taken hostage: 412
in 1997 alone, as compared to 411 for the previous five years, 1992 to 1996,
combined. From 1991 to 1996, 55 crewmembers were killed aboard ship, while 51
were reported killed in 1997 alone. Table 3.3 shows the types of violence to the crew
from 1991 to 1998.
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Table 3.3
Type of violence

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Grand
total

Crew taken Hostage

33

18

6

11

182

194

412

228

1084

Crew threatened

3

9

1

8

59

52

116

067

0315

Crew assaulted

1

12

4

0

2

9

22

060

0110

Number of crew injured

4

16

3

10

3

9

30

035

0110

Number of crew killed

0

3

0

0

26

26

51

067

0173

42

62

14

29

272

290

631

467

1807

Total

(Source: Compiled from BIMCO, special bulletin, 1998 / IMB annual report 1999)

Figure 3.3
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Beside the physical and the property losses, there is another matter that should not be
ignored, which is the psychological effect. As Rev. Peter Ellis described them in the
3rd Kuala Lumpur Piracy meeting, “Seafarers may fear future attacks, experience
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‘flashbacks’ to these attacks, or have post-traumatic stress.” Rev. Ellis spoke of a
case where a victim came to the seamen’s church institute director asking for his
rights. Later on, a quick reply came from his company saying that he would paid for
the value of his property. Nothing, however, could possibly compensate him for the
trauma he suffered.

Officers are more likely to be attacked while crewmembers are merely regarded as
pawns. According to a survey presented by Captain Choy Ngee Cheng in the 3rd
International Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, all ranks on board were aware of the
problems of piracy, but the lower ranks were less anxious about piracy. He also
added that since larger shipping companies are more prone to attack, they are also
more proactive in measures to counter piratical attacks.

3.7 Dangerous world wide areas

General speaking, no area can be considered absolutely safe. However, there is a
general belief that piracy is an activity rampant in poor countries where there is
corruption and where the forces of law and order do not exist or are corrupt as well
.From the report of the 70 meeting of the MSC (1998/12), the area most affected by
pirates and armed robbers continued to be the same in the South China Sea, Strait of
Malacca, Indian Ocean, East and West Africa, and South America. However, attacks
also happen even outside those spots. In the USA, five crewmembers including the
master were gunned down and killed aboard the general cargo ship Vanderpool
Express which was berthed in Miami, Florida (Smith, 1998). Europe has not escaped
from the threat either. According to B.A.H.Parrit’s book “Security at Sea” pirates in
France spray sleeping gas into the cabin door vent. As soon as the occupant is
incapacitated, they steal his belongings.
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3.8 Preventive measures

It is difficult for a crew to guard a weather deck the size of several football fields.
However, following some simple precautionary measures can significantly reduce
the risk of attack. Above all, potential raiders will be discouraged by visible evidence
of good ship security and vigilance. The anti-attack plan should be prepared and
ready to be implemented when a ship is trading in areas where attacks are known to
occur. Furthermore some companies, as B.A.H.Parrit mentions in his book, believe
that pirate attacks cannot take place if proper protective measures are in place, that
no excuse is acceptable and that if those people get on board, the master must be
disciplined. Therefore, crew should be trained on the basis that an attack will take
place and not in the belief that with some luck it might not happen.

3.8.1 General precautions

There are two factors that encourage pirates to commit their attacks, namely, cash
and smaller crew.
•

Cash

Parrit advises that “generally, the master’s safe is the prime target of pirates and
so it makes good sense to fit two safes to ships, one in the master’s cabin, where a
small amount of currency can be held and another where the majority of the ship’s
cash can be stowed.” However, even if the cash is dispersed throughout the ship,
the attackers will intimidate crewmembers until the locations have been revealed
(UK DETR). Therefore, the first preventive measure to be taken is to carry as
little cash as possible. Although it is recognized that there is always some need to
carry cash, the banking system today is such that it is relatively easy to send
money across the world. For instance, STASCO (Shell International Trading &
Shipping Company) instituted measures to eliminate the need to carry large sums
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of cash, where all crews are salaried, and the use of cash for business purposes is
strictly limited wherever practicable.
• Smaller crew
There is the universal problem in shipping where shipowners are cutting down
on crew numbers. A small crew engaged in ensuring the safe navigation of
their ship will have the additional onerous task of maintaining high levels of
security surveillance for prolonged periods. Thus was stressed in a Kuala
Lumpur meeting June 1998 by Mr. A. Linnington, who added that “25% of
seafarers’ working hours are in excess of 80 working hours. In addition, they
have to cope with the additional pressure of piracy.”

3.8.1.1 Establishing secure area(s)
Depending upon the extent to which areas can be effectively sealed off which, by its
turn depends on the construction of the accommodation, secure area(s) can be
established where crew members could possibly retreat to, in case of a pirate attack.
This

used to be known as the “citadel” which attackers will find difficulty to

penetrate. It can also be used at night by those who are not engaged in essential
outside duties. The secure area(s) can be established in the accommodation as a
whole, around the bridge and/or inside the engine room. Such areas should give
direct access to the key areas on the ship such as bridge, radio office, and engine
room. When establishing secure areas provision should be made for escape during a
fire or other emergency. In any situation where there is a conflict between safety and
security, however, the safety requirement should be paramount. In any event,
attempts should be made to incorporate appropriate safety provisions while allowing
access and exits to be secured or controlled.
3.8.2 Anti attack plan when vessel is in port

Every effort should be made to limit the circulation of documents giving information
on the cargo or their location on the ship. The minimum number of cargo manifests
should be issued with only a general description of cargo. BIMCO agrees and insists
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that even the sailing route and schedules should be confidential (Lloyd’s List, April
18, 1998). Local agents play a role in these matters and should be chosen with great
care.

Superstructure entrances should be restricted by securing all portholes and house
doors, including the wings. All possible means of access to the ship like gangways,
ramps, pilot ladder should be sealed or removed when not in use or at night. Even the
access to the accommodation, storage, lockers, and hatches must be sealed.

Ropes or wires should not be left trailing over the side. People who are allowed
access on board must be controlled. Names of those who are admitted must be
recorded. Photographing can be a useful deterrent and may assist the identification of
attackers who may have had access to the ship prior to their attack. Regardless if a
local gangway watchman is employed crewmembers should be assigned to the
gangway to ensure that access to the ship is restricted only to authorized persons.
Local traders must not be allowed on board to sell their wares. Crew should never
trade with them particularly when they use small crafts to approach the ship. Deck
watchmen should make their rounds especially around the rear of the vessel at
irregular intervals to avoid thieves timing boarding in between rounds. Crewmen on
watches should maintain radio contact with the bridge, checking in at regular
intervals.

The fire hoses should be under pressure and readily available for use, the hawse pipe
should be covered by a buckler plate, the anchor wash-down water should be
activated or a charged fire hose positioned to discharge through the hawse pipe down
the chain when at anchor.

All decks and quayside areas should be illuminated during the night. Droplight must
be rigged over the side. Crew members on duty outside the ship’s secure areas should
avail themselves of shadow and avoid being silhouetted by deck lights as this may
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make them targets for seizure by approaching attackers. The ship should be
thoroughly searched and all doors or access points especially of vulnerable areas like
the bridge, engine room, steering space secured or controlled.

3.8.3 Anti attack plan when vessel is underway

On the bridge, to maintain surveillance of the water around the ship, a constant shortrange radar watch should be maintained by switching to the 1.5 or 3 miles scale, and
a guard ring may be set up with an audible alarm for contacts close aboard. The
movements of the ship through the water, and the turbulence caused by the screws,
form echoes on the radar screen, which can cause small boats to “disappear”.
Attention should be given to the fact that ship’s radar will probably not detect rubber
craft and it can not detect targets in its blind sector. Therefore, the use of small yacht
radar, fitted in such a way to ensure complete coverage of the stern or blind sector,
unobscured by the ship’s radar, should be considered.

The ship’s main deck should be blacked out apart from the mandatory navigation
lights. The logic behind the concept is that a potential attacker will not be able to see
what awaits him. By contrast, when he approaches a fully illuminated ship, the
attacker is able to see whether there is an effective watch and if any measures are in
operation to try to repel any boarding (IMB special report). However, the water
surface in the immediate vicinity of the vessel should be illuminated. Wide beam
floods could illuminate the area astern of the ship. Signal projector lights can be used
systematically to probe for suspect craft using radar guidance if possible.

When possible a lookout at the stern is very important. Pirates frequently board the
ship at the stern because firstly, they have to “overtake,” which is easily done via the
stern. Secondly, accommodation lighting is usually on, enabling them to see every
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movement on board. In high risk areas, in order to provide a dedicated radar and
visual watch for small craft which might attempt to maneuver alongside, and to allow
the watchkeepers to concentrate on normal navigational duties, bridge watches and
lookouts should be doubled. An additional officer should assist the normal bridge
watchkeepers especially at night since most attacks occur between the hours 0100
and 0600.
Restricted superstructure entrances should be established by securing all portholes
and house doors, access points should be regularly checked, especially those that can
be used in the event of on board emergency.

3.8.4 Ship’s practice in high-risk area

The ship’s crew should practice and perfect the procedures set down in the ship’s
anti-attack plan including the use of alarm signals or any additional surveillance or
detection equipment installed on the vessel. A suitably qualified Radio Operator
should be on duty at all times. Masters should bear in mind the possibility that
attackers are monitoring ship-to-shore communications and using intercepted
information to select their targets. Caution should, therefore, be exercised when
transmitting information on cargo or valuables on board by radio in those areas.

If possible, ships should be routed away from areas where attacks are known to take
place and in particular seek to avoid bottlenecks. If ships are approaching ports
where attacks take place on ships at anchor rather than on vessels underway, the
ship’s arrival should be timed so as to coincide with daylight. If a long waiting time
before berthing is anticipated, “making a number” to establish berth priority and then
retreating into safer deep waters must be considered. It is better to sail slow or stop
during the passage and arrive when certain that a berth is vacant. Capt. C. Smith
recommends in BIMCO Bulletin Maritime Security 98 that vessels “trading along
coasts known for pirate attacks … stay well away from shore (i.e. about 50 nautical
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miles), to avoid proceeding between the mainland and islands, to sail at full speed,
and to keep as many lookouts as can be spared.”

An appropriate procedure must be carried out to ensure that all transmitting systems
are available for immediate use. Ship position if not automatically stored, must be
manually updated at regular intervals into GMDSS installations. Where an
INMARSAT ship earth station is provided it may prove useful to draft and store
standard message format (MSC/circ. 623 Appendix 1) for ready use in an emergency
in either the equipment’s memory or on computer disk. A special code for
“piracy/armed robbery attack” is now available for use on digital selective calling
(DSC) equipment.

3.9 If Attackers are detected

The demonstration of detection is of tentimes enough to repel boarders. On the other
hand, pirates are fully aware that their success in carrying out their attacks rely on
maintaining the element of surprise (1998 report of piracy -Counter piracy Operation
Center). Small craft that appears to be matching the speed of the vessel on a parallel
or following course should always be treated as expected danger. When a suspect
craft has been noticed it is important that an effective all-round watch must be
maintained. Pirates always use alternative tactics to board a ship; a decoy boat is
used to distract the crew from one side while other boats approach the other side. The
first person that sights the potential attack should notify the crew on watch. As far as
practical, all lights should be put on as searchlights can be used to dazzle anyone
approaching the ship and to enable the crew to monitor their activities (IMB Piracy
and Armed Robbery Against Ships, a Special Report). However, this could also place
the crew at a disadvantage at a crucial point due to the temporary loss of their night
vision. Sirens should be sounded as alarm signals including the ship’s whistle will
help crewmembers in exposed locations to select the most appropriate route to return
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to a secure area. People should be seen running and a whole attitude of energy and
preparation should be demonstrated.

An evasive approach could be used, by increasing vessel’s speed and altering course
to seaward if possible (ISF, Pirates and armed robbers, a Master’s guide 2nd Ed) as
the effect of the bow wave and wash may deter the attackers and make it difficult for
them to attach poles or grappling irons to the ship. The not under command (NUC)
light should be switched on to warn other vessels in the vicinity that an attack is
about to take place and vigorous maneuver is being carried out. Maneuvers of this
kind, however, should not be used in confined or congested waters. It is also not
suitable for a vessel constrained by her draught to navigate in confined route such as
Malacca and Singapore Straits. For such situations the use of fire hoses to direct a
steam of water at suspicious approaching motor boats can be considered although
such action in cases where raiders are known to be armed with firearms is not
recommended. If used, the recommended pressure is at least 80 Pounds per square
inch. With such pressure, not only does the attacker have to fight against the jet of
water but also the flow may swamp his boat and damage engines and electrical
systems (MSC/Circ.623 June 1993).

Tear gas could be extremely effective against pirate boats. Even in strong winds, a
short duration of concentrated gas from a gas bomb would cause chaos and thus
provide a useful deterrent. Cattle prods are another useful non-lethal defense.
Distress flares, on the other hand, should only be used when the master considers that
the attackers actions are putting his ship in imminent danger. If they are attempting to
board using grappling hooks, the line attached to the hooks should be cut (Master’s
guide 2nd Ed, ISF).

Shore stations and other ships in the vicinity should be alerted that the guidance for
the use of radio signals (MSC/Circ. 805) should be complied with. The guidance
distinguishes the attack between two phases - either the pirates are detected before
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boarding the ship or the pirates board unnoticed, taking hostages and making threats
of violence to the ship’s crew. In the former case, contact should immediately be
made with ships in the vicinity and shore authorities by sending the message through
Inmarsat or DSC or other distress and safety frequency or through any other methods
to make the pirates aware that they have been detected. In the latter case the ship
most probably will be ordered by pirates not to make any form of transmission. In
order to avoid any physical violence or death to the crew, any such order should be
complied with.
3.10 If attackers board

Obviously, the most effective way to meet the problem is to prevent the pirates from
boarding the ship in the first place. If, however, in spite of best efforts the ship is
boarded, then the priority must shift and a “damage control” attitude must come to
the fore.
Once pirates have boarded, adhere as closely as is practical to the prearranged antipiracy plan, retreating to the designated secure area(s) if necessary, ensuring that all
crew is inside. The action of the master and crew should be aimed at securing the
safety of those on board the vessel, ensuring that the crew control the navigation of
the vessel and securing the earliest possible departure of the attackers.

The options of reaction available to the master and crew will depend on the extent to
which the attackers have secured control of the vessel. If the master is certain that all
his crew are within secure areas and that the attackers cannot gain access or by their
actions outside the secure areas place the entire ship at imminent risk by using
firebombs to start fires on a tanker, for example, then he may consider undertaking
evasive maneuver to encourage the attackers to return to their craft.

When the attackers are in possession of firearms, compliance with their orders is
recommended. On the other hand, the master can use a sortie by a well organized
crew if he knows exactly where the attackers are on the ship, they are not carrying
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firearms or other potentially lethal weapons and that the number of crew involved
significantly outnumbers the attackers they will face. The intention should be to
encourage the attackers back to their craft. Crew members should not seek to come
between the attackers and their craft nor should they seek to capture attackers as to
do so may increase their resistance which in turn increases the risk faced by members
of the sortie party. Once outside the secure area the sortie party should always stay
together. Pursuit of an individual attacker by a lone crewmember should not be
undertaken as it may result in the crewmember being isolated and seized. Seizure of
a crewmember is one of the more common means of attackers gaining control over a
ship. Crewmembers should be in constant communication with the bridge and should
be recalled if their line of withdrawal to a secure area is threatened. Crew may
consider using fire hoses.

However, it must be kept in mind that the use of aggressive physical action may
serve to escalate the violence. Even if the attacker does not possess a weapon, crew
members are not totally safe. According to the IMB report on an attack in Douala,
that crew members used “anti-aggression” sprays on the attackers, which made one
of them react by picking up a metal fitting and throwing it at the officer, hitting him
on the head, and causing a severe injury. Rev. Peter Ellis advises that the “best way
to avoid physical harm is to keep a cool head, keep to normal procedures, and to
remember that co-operation is still the best policy.”

3.11 If attackers gain control

The master or officer in charge should remain calm and, if possible, seek to negotiate
with the attackers with the intention of maintaining the crew’s control over the
navigation of the ship, the safe return of any hostages they may hold, and the early
departure of the attackers from the ship. Securing ship control to the ship officer is of
paramount importance to avoid a significant risk of collision or grounding with
accompanying loss of life or a major pollution and a large scale environmental
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disaster. According to the IMO 1998 annual report, chemical gas and oil tankers
were the target of 26.6% of the reported incidents. In the Malacca Strait, one of the
busiest waterways in the world and used by numerous fully laden tankers, the
greatest possible time interval between ships in any one direction is about twenty
minutes and the lateral clearance between two ships going in opposite directions is
sometimes no more than a mile. The loss of control over a vessel due to a pirate
attack in such narrow waterways could have disastrous consequences for the marine
and coastal environment.
3.12 After the attack

Crewmembers should remain in the designated secure areas until a prearranged all
clear signal has been given, confirming that the pirates have left the vessel. If the
attack has resulted in the death of or serious injury to any person on board the ship or
serious damage to the ship itself, an immediate signal should also be sent to the
ship’s maritime administration which usually has its statutory requirements covering
the duty to report such disasters. Medical treatment should also be provided. All
evidence of the attack should be collected including CCTV (close-circuit television
system) and other recordings of the incident, a full inventory including a description
of any personal possessions or equipment taken, with serial numbers when known,
should be prepared. Crew who meet the fight should make written statement of the
events, including detailed descriptions of the perpetrators. Characteristics such as
tattoos, scars and other distinguishing marks should be noted. The master should
submit a comprehensive reports including: a description of the pirates; their number
and nationality; the number and type of boats involved; how the ship was boarded;
when and where the attack took place and details of the attack. These reports must be
made to the ship owners, local enforcement agencies, and the Rescue Co-ordination
Center (RCC).
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CHAPTER 4

Stowaway - Unauthorized Boarding of Ship

4.1 General

“The definition of a stowaway according to Oxford dictionary is a person who hides
on board a ship or aircraft to get a free passage.” Said Captain Neerav in BIMCO
special bulletin. In the maritime field, the word stowaway is a traditional maritime
word to describe an unauthorized passenger on a ship. At the heart of the current
problem is the fact that this simple word now represents a most complex philosophy.
It includes refugees, illegal immigrants, economic refugees, economic asylumseekers and political asylum-seekers. In simple terms a stowaway is a criminal. He is
travelling without payment, or in contravention of a national law. But when trying to
define the actual ‘criminality’ of a stowaway, it can create great confusion. However,
this word is commonly used to describe the person who hides himself on board ship
to leave his homeland and escape persecution, war and poverty.

It is clearly recognized that the resolution of stowaway cases is difficult because of
different national legislation in each of the several potential countries involved: the
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country of embarkation, the country of disembarkation, the flag state of the vessel,
the country of apparent or actual nationality/citizenship of the stowaway and
countries of transit during repatriation. Therefore, it can be said that the problem in
stowaway cases can be extremely complicated.

4.2 Nature of the problems

From the ship’s view point , this problem will be addressed to the master because he
is always the focal point of any dispute. Ultimately, he and his crew have to deal
with the existence of the stowaway on board. Moreover, he has to make the
command decision as to what to do until an external resolution, by arranging the
disembarkation of the stowaway from the ship, can be achieved. In addition, if such
achievement is not an easy task, the safety of ship’s crew can be compromised by
stowaways on board –especially when they outnumber the crew- as the stowaways
can become progressively agitated and violent if they are faced with long stays on
board as a result of difficulties in repatriation or disembarkation. ”Many cases have
been reported of stowaways having spent months or even years on board before a
solution is found.” Said Brian Parkinson of (ICC) in BIMCO special bulletin.
According to Captain Tony Goh in the book “Stowaways By Sea”, there is a case
where a Brazilian had been on board various ships for about two years before he was
repatriated. On the other hand it is important not to forget that ship’s crew are in the
unenviable position of having to cater for a most unwelcome guest in what is
normally a close-knit community where routine and harmony are essential.
This is the drama of stowaways when being found. When they are not discovered,
this can be a catastrophe. “It is certainly not over dramatic to claim that stowaways
present a danger to the ships themselves,” was the idea extracted from an article in
P&I International, called ‘Cracking down on the stowaway’. The author continued,
“It only takes one lighted cigarette dropped in the cab of a truck to start a fire, which
can, as it did in a recent major claim, call for a master to release his entire smothering
equipment to avoid a large fire. An event no master would wish to undertake at any
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time during his career.” In addition, stowaways can cause cargo damage, “Many are
thieves,” added the same author, “looking to steal cargo and ‘jump’ ship at the next
port. Many have been found with tool kits for just that purpose.” In his article
”Stowaway prevention and detection”, Jonathan Nicholson said, “The consequences
of failure to detect stowaways can lead to fine from immigration authorities, and
spiralling security and repatriation costs.” “On other occasions”, said Brian
Parkinson to Seaways, “stowaways have lost their lives by hiding inside sealed cargo
units or by secreting themselves in cargo areas which are subsequently fumigated.”

4.3 Stowaways on board - behavior and treatment

In general, stowaways discovered prior to departure are easily disembarked.
Problems become more complicated, however, as the distance from the boarding port
increases. The first consideration upon the discovery of a stowaway should be
whether it is possible to return to the port at which the individual comes on board. If
it is not possible, the ship’s master will recognize that stowaways may be on board a
vessel for a considerable period of time because the vessel is far from its next port
and/or, as mentioned above, not able to deviate from its course in order to disembark
them at the port of embarkation. During this period, those people become an
extremely heavy burden for the master and his crew, who are inevitably anxious to
be rid of such people as soon as possible, at least from the point of view of the
inconvenience and disruption that they cause. For these reasons, the treatment of
stowaways, once discovered, is an issue which needs to be addressed as it also bears
on security.

The following considerations and steps must therefore be kept in mind

- Any details must be obtained from them. The Master should take a statement from
the stowaway covering all details of his citizenship and actions. Photographs of the
stowaway should be taken and kept by the Master. The IMO has approved a standard
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list of details for this purpose (‘Guidelines on the allocation of responsibilities to
seek the successful resolution of stowaway cases’) (A20/Res.871 27 November
1997). Also A notification of the existence of a stowaway and any relevant details
should be made by the master to his shipowner and appropriate authorities at the port
of embarkation, the next port of call and the flag state.

- The stowaway once discovered, should be searched for concealed weapons and
drugs. Stowaways of tentimes carry these as their passport to a ‘new life’ elsewhere.
If found, such contraband should naturally be confiscated. Stowaways can be
involved in drug smuggling by two means, either as mere opportunists seeking to
finance a new life in a new country with the illgotten profit obtained from the sale of
their contraband, or as “mules” under the employment of an organized drug
smuggling operation, as the adept crime groups have now realized that there are
many poor people who will perform illegal acts to be illegally transported from
impoverished countries to lands offering better opportunities. The involvement of
stowaways in the illicit movement of narcotics is now becoming an increasing
problem, and according to BIMCO bulletin no. 2/1998 there are no signs of
abatement.

- Most of them give false information concerning their nationality and other personal
details to avoid being returned to the country they came from. For this reason, a
thorough search of identification papers in the area where the stowaway was found
should be conducted. The Master should keep such identification papers in the ship’s
safe, as this will reduce the likelihood of the stowaway jumping ship prior to being
put into the custody of immigration officials. Such incidents have been known to
occur, causing lengthy delays and additional costs during subsequent investigations.

- The effect of locking individuals away, plus the trauma of stowing away and being
detected, can lead these people to suicidal tendencies. They appear so utterly
desperate that they are prepared to die in the attempt to escape in highly dangerous
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circumstances. For this reason, they must be closely monitored 24 hours around the
clock and any item that may conceivably be utilized as a weapon should be removed,
to ensure that no attempt can be made to take their own lives.

- Stowaways may falsify and make accusations against ship’s crew. They could
claim that they had been physically abused whilst on board ship, or that one of them
had been thrown overboard. (BIMCO bulletin, No 6/98) For this reason, it is a
distinct advantage to photograph or videotape stowaways periodically whilst they are
on board, as this can be used as evidence to establish the conditions under which they
were kept during their stay on board.

- For humanitarian reasons, it is important to provide them adequate food, washroom
facilities and quarters where they should be confined to, as this will ensure their and
the crew’s safety until the time of disembarkation. Confining is not a matter
proposed for discussion; stowaways must always be kept locked up, preferably in a
main deck room of some sort with limited subsistence and things to do such as
reading. They must not be allowed in the bridge area, in the engine room, or any vital
spaces like the steering gear room by any chance. In addition, they must not have
access to a porthole which may facilitate escape.

- There is, of course, a temptation to restow the stowaways in the container and see
them landed ashore. This course of action should not be pursued for a number of
reasons:
1- Humanitarian - the container may be landed and left isolated or hemmed in by
other containers.
2- Trust no one! If the stowaways are offered inducements to tell about their time
on board they will do so.
3- The fines for collusion will be higher.
4- It is easier to manage a situation where all the facts are known than it is to
practice deception.
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5- It is reasonable to expect that immigration officials will assume that the ship is
‘in on the racket’ unless proved otherwise. Attempting to evade responsibility
could leave the master in custody.

- Stowaways must be led to believe that it is inevitable that they will be repatriated,
and the quicker they co-operate the more comfortable they will be. Thus a strategy
must be followed. Since stowaways differ from each other, the strategy followed
must vary also. For some of them, boredom is the best solution to encourage them to
speak out against their intentions and actually discourages them also from illegally
boarding other vessels. Some stowaways have been identified as criminals fleeing
arrest. In such cases, as Martin Turner stated in an article called “Ship security and
the Prevention of Stowaways”, “an atmosphere should be created which makes it
clear that they are unwelcome in order to prompt them to be honest with questioners
seeking their disembarkation.” This atmosphere could be created by adopting tough
measures and by not making them too comfortable: These offenders may need to be
shut in steel surroundings such as a linen store or a handling room without any
fittings. Crew should not be encouraged to fraternize with the stowaway. Food
should be adequate rather than generous. For the others, as B. A. H. Parrit stated,
“The opportunity to become more involved should be seen as a reward in return for
more complete information.”

- In the book “Stowaways By Sea”. Bill Robertson warned masters from allowing
stowaways to work, he said, “Some of them can develop a good relationship with the
Master and crew. Consequently, under certain circumstances, the owner can agree
that he might work and be paid.” This arrangement is strictly not recommended. The
owner would lose his P&I insurance cover if the stowaway was signed on as a crew
member and so would be unable to recover repatriation costs. In fact, making
stowaways work is attractive in terms of labour cost, but some may take their case of
exploitation to the ITF, and others could arrange to arrest the ship on return to the
stowaway port on the grounds of improper treatment.
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- As mentioned before, some stowaways are known criminals. Therefore, the
potential for violence should be taken seriously as some can be violent and very
disruptive. For this reason, they should never be left unlocked with less than two
people in attendance. “Groups”, said Martin Turner, “should be split up into
manageable sizes where at all possible and kept confined.” As mentioned earlier,
anything that may be utilized as a weapon should be removed.

- Stowaway may not be healthy and may carry contagious diseases and should
therefore be isolated.

- Generally speaking, stowaways must of course be treated humanely. Nevertheless,
it should not be forgotten that they are trespassers who represent an unpredictable
presence on board what is a very restricted environment. It should be kept in mind,
however, that a stowaway on board becomes liable to the same laws, regulations and
discipline as the crew.

- Success in getting accurate information from the stowaway is highly important.
This information, if well presented and demonstrates reasonable concern, may be
used to mitigate any fines imposed on the vessel and any risk that the master might
be detained ashore pending an investigation. For this reason, the aim of the ship must
be to present the best possible case in the event of a subsequent inquiry. This should
comprise the logbook entry of a thorough search for stowaways before (and after)
departure, a statement about how the stowaways were found, where they boarded the
vessel, what precautions were taken to guard against the problem, as much factual
information about the stowaway possible, and his motives for stowing away.

- To ensure the correctness of the information, checking of their stories, during the
voyage, for consistency and recording points made in conversation to assess its
validity are important. In addition, ask the P&I correspondent to check out the
name(s) with a specialized agency keeping a register of known ‘repeaters’. Use of
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such a specialized agency is very useful in discovering by means of a computer-aided
database if a stowaway is a ‘repeater’, as it saves time in determining identity and
thus saves cost.

- When approaching any port of call, security measures need to be heightened to
ensure that the stowaway does not escape. Escape can be expected to result in a fine
against ship interests from the local Immigration authorities. In addition, according to
capt. Cristoff iiddeke in the article “Security on board” the master should know that
in most ports there is a legal obligation to notify the immigration authorities in
advance about stowaways on board other wise heavy fine can be imposed.

- Always consider transferring a stowaway to a sister ship returning to the country of
origin. Where the stowaway has to be landed, check his general medical condition
and insist that the immigration officials are there to meet the ship on arrival. A
stowaway can demand a lot of time and effort on board and the sooner the shipboard
side is closed the better.

4.4 Measures to Prevent Stowaway

Stowaways are the most common instance involving a breach of ship security.
Indeed, the frequency of incidents tends to create a feeling of resignation and
inevitability that serves to perpetrate the problem. Consequently, the best solution
must be therefore to take the strongest possible measures to prevent the stowaway
from getting on board. It is not easy, but steps can be taken which do reduce the risk.

4.4.1 Methods of Illegal boarding

- Most of stowaways get their information from the stevedore or through the sailing
signboard of the vessel’s next port of call, before deciding to stow away on board.

47

Whilst obtaining access to the vessel, they get the adequate assistance from shore
labor who give them their company hats and overalls.
Although the methods used to board vary with the type of ship, they can be
summarized as the following:

- Boarding on foot up the gangway when alongside or anchored off in port by people
such as port workers and stevedores who are authorized to board and then do not
disembark.(Peter Duffield, Stowaways By Sea, 103)

- Boarding by climbing over the side of the ship or up anchor chains and hawsers or
by using a rope, grappling iron or hooked bamboo poles. Climbing aboard may be
attempted when the ship alongside, anchored off in port, and when underway, within
small boat range of the shore. Then they hide themselves some where in many
thousands of square meters of crowded space aboard the ship.(Peter Duffield,
Stowaways By Sea, 103)

- Boarding concealed in cargo which is being loaded –general cargo, vehicles and
containers. They remove container door, and then with outside assistance, enter the
container and secure themselves inside with the bolt seals seemingly intact.(BIMCO
review, 1999, 92)

Having boarded on foot or climbed aboard the aim being to avoid discovery until the
ship has sailed and is well clear of the port. Many stowaways have little idea of the
layout of a ship and will hide anywhere, which they can access. They have been
known to hide in dangerous spaces they may attempt to avoid detection throughout
the journey and disembark covertly.
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4.4.2 Technical Defense Against boarding of Stowaway

Defense of a ship against stowaways boarding should be looked at from the
following two aspects:

Firstly, Stopping unauthorized people boarding the ship at all.Secondly, Detecting,
apprehending and disembarking any unauthorized persons who do succeed in
boarding; among these are people who, having been authorized to board, as port
officials, stevedores, etc., fail to disembark plus those who succeed in boarding
illegally.

4.4.3. Security Measures

Stopping Stowaways getting on board is difficult but with a realistic ship security
plan, practical support and motivation of the company, and with proper and precise
crew training, it can be done In this respect, implementation of the following
measures will reduce the risks of persons stowing away:

- Whilst the vessel is in port or at anchor, accommodation doors should be locked or
guarded, except one access which should be illuminated and guarded. Similarly when
possible, access to the vessel should be restricted to the gangway only or stern ramp
in RO-RO ships putting into account that the local watchman in many developing
ports is usually a waste of time and money. The gangway is always manned when in
harbour by a member of the crew.

- Access to accommodation areas and other areas of the ship not associated with
cargo operations should be restricted so far as is practical, by locking or guarding
such doorways. Crew members should be encouraged to challenge strangers where
they encounter them in unexpected areas.(Turner, p 61)
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- Sealing off certain parts of the ship to prevent access and reduce the areas and
compartments which may need to be searched .The hatches to the machinery and
thrusters fore and aft are normally locked when in port except when crew are
working in these spaces. The hatches to the holds are also normally locked when in
port except when holds are being loaded or unloaded. Storage lockers, machinery
rooms and any other areas which do not need to be open, should be locked or sealed,
providing that the securing of such areas does not interfere with the normal working
of the ship or pose a possible safety hazard.(The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance
Association Limited General advice issued to members)

- The movements of stevedores and shore labour on board should be monitored and
restricted to the area for which they are employed. Stevedoring gangs especially
should be recorded, with stevedoring companies being required to declare how many
stevedores will be boarding, and use only of the gangway for access.

- Other crew members should be separate from gangway watch and should patrol
deck areas to ensure vigilance against stowaway climbing aboard. Moreover, all crew
members should have a tendency to conduct the so called “random patrol” which are
continually on the look out for people in unusual areas. The value of the random
patrol can be significantly improved if all members of the crew are willing to report
any abnormal activity

- “Placing appropriate personnel not only at the gangway to check all personnel
boarding and disembarking the vessel, but at other pertinent points on the vessel to
check personnel.” Said Bill Robertson, from Robmarine Shipping Consultants, in an
article to Seaways. He added, “At night, keep the same look-outs posted, particularly
to prevent stowaways gaining access by climbing aboard the vessel both at port and
at any anchorage.”
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- Good coverage of all around deck lighting will improve the effectiveness of the
lookouts at night at night.(The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited
General advice issued to members) Lighting can discourage stowaway from even
approaching a ship.

- Conducting searches of vehicles and loose cargo. Although a high percentage of
cargo is containerized, people do attempt to board in general, loose cargo and once
aboard, they will try to find somewhere else to hide. In fact, stowaways can be very
mobile and often move by stealth. They are constantly on the look-out for search
teams, and are quick to move to a ‘searched’ area once the team have passed through.
According P&I International March 1999 “many stowaways remain undetected
because of this very reason. Stowaways attempting to board in vehicles are a
particular problem in RO-RO ships. Those who board concealed in cars and light
vehicles will also seek somewhere to hide. Large vehicles, many of which are sealed,
present a bigger obstacle However, Given time, effective visual searches are possible
with open vehicles and cargo, but virtually impossible in sealed vehicles and cargo”.

- The vessel should be searched thoroughly before departure. Intelligent and
systematic searching before sailing is a necessity beginning at either the bow or
stern, moving from one end of the vessel to the other. Although ships are difficult to
search, a conscientious planned search of spaces, coupled with locking and sealing
procedures does raise the likelihood of success considerably. During such search the
integrity of locks on sea chests and storage lockers should be checked. The article
“Cracking down on the stowaway” suggested the use of guard dogs. According to it,
guard dogs only really feasible on liner routes where the port authorities are well
appraised of the new ‘crew’. Guard dogs and their handlers can be stationed at access
points. Result are swift and immediate. The reduction of the number of stowaways
trying to get on board is immediate. However, in “Stowaway at sea” some of usual
places addressed by captain R. Brook-hart where stowaway have been found:
The chain locker
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The paint store/forecastle store
Inside sealed containers (having entered the containers before being loaded)
In the hatches
In the funnel
Beneath the floor plates in the engine room; sometimes beneath the bilge water and
breathing through a hose pipe (often carrying a short pipe to breathe under water
when the bilges are being searched)
In the room recess of the stern ramp on a RO-RO ships
In the pump room on tankers

- If practicable (in coordination with the port authority), container seals should be
examined for signs of tampering before loading. Any loaded, empty or unsealed
containers should be checked and sealed before loading. Where stowaways are
known to use containers in a particular port, inquiries could be made as to the
availability of carbon dioxide “people sniffers” with which to check containers prior
to loading. There is a container detector called “Human Occupancy Detector AMCCO2”. It reacts to higher than average levels of CO2 within a sealed container
without the need to break the seal. This is done by taking an air sample through a
probe and analyzing the result. ( Crime at sea 1992) In addition, it is important to
look for signs of leaking urine, remnants of food or a smell of feces, as stowaways
hidden in containers may be discovered in this way (Nicolson,1998).

- A new and radical approach to stowaway detection was suggested in the article
“Cracking down on the stowaway”, which is the use of movement/heat sensors.
These can be positioned over access between holds and with an alarm for each zone
or hold which can be located on the bridge. During the stowaway search, one team
member can monitor the alarms and contact the search team if an alarm sounds,
advising them of the location of any sounding alarm. During the passage the alarms
can remain active and a watch officer alerted to any movement between decks and

52

holds. Heat/movement detectors are inexpensive to fit and, most importantly, there is
no additional demand on crew time.

- Checking everyone embarking and disembarking using a pass system. Everyone in
a port area should have a pass issued by the port authority to gain entry into the
complex, but this does not mean that they can embark on board any ship; ships or
their agents should issue their own unique passes. At its most simple this pass can
merely have a number on the pass and be coloured or marked to avoid repetition of
use. These passes must be retrieved when the visitor gets off and, provided control at
the access point is firm, at least it will be known if someone has not disembarked. If
the master feels he can expand on this simple system, then before the pass is issued,
the name of the visitor can be noted against the number of the pass and proof of
identity obtained which is kept at the gangway _ e.g., driving license or credit
card.(Peter Duffield, Stowaways By Sea, p 106)

- Issuing passes, or numbered vests, etc.; to stevedores can often be a complete waste
of time and money. One satisfactory method is, with the agreement of those
concerned, to fit a non-tamper proof band to the wrist of the stevedore, which has to
be cut off when the stevedore departs. This avoid the well-tried trick of getting on
board with a pass, and then handing it over to someone who is going ashore for them
to hand over to someone else.

- Disincentives, punishments, of crew who fail in their pre-sailing searches are not to
be encouraged given that it may lead to a situation where the stowaway is maltreated.

- Use of psychology. There are a variety of psychological ‘ploys’, which have been
used by masters in the past, with differing degrees of success. They may be useful in
the future. The following are example
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1. False destination notices set outside the ship - e.g., poor port, as the next ship’s
destination port would probably be less attractive to potential stowaways than one
of the developed country port
2. Announcement that there is a ‘fire’ or ‘emergency’ on the ship followed by the
sounding of alarm bells and shouts in the appropriate languages.
3. Announcements that gas bombs or dogs are going to be released in the ship.

- Payment of a cash bonus to the agent if no stowaways comes aboard at his port is
important. A similar bonus to be paid to the crew if stowaways are found before
sailing. To be effective the amount of the bonus has to be attractive
(Turner).Complete trust and confidence in the crew must be a prerequisite of this
approach. It explained, “For example, a bonus paid to a member finding a stowaway
could be open to abuse by a crew member’s friend willing to come on board and be
caught.”

- All possible information from all available sources, concerning the stowaway
problem in the visiting area, should be collected. This help ship’s master how much
reliance can be placed on port security. In ports where the risk of stowing away is
high, this reliance will be very low and masters have to depend mainly on their own
resources and defensive measures.
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CHAPTER 5

Terrorism at Sea

5.1 General

Terrorism, in general, is a phenomenon that has captured the attention of the world.
Every one thinks that he instinctively knows what terrorists do and how they operate,
but when it comes to actually defining the term terrorism, insurmountable obstacles
arises. It is a term fraught with political and ideological pitfalls. In ‘Violence at Sea’,
Professor Wilkinson defined Terrorism as the “Systematic, indiscriminate use of
murder, injury and destruction or threat of the same to create a climate of terror, to
publicize a cause, usually political or religio-political, and to coerce a wider target
into submitting to the terrorist’s aims. This mode of violence becomes international
when it is exported across international frontiers or used against foreign targets in the
terrorist’s country of origin.”

5.2 Nature of Terrorism

Terrorism is an act carried out for a “cause” rather than for personal benefit. It is
because of the pursuit of this non-financial “cause” that the participants see
themselves as special because they are risking their lives for a motive unconnected
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with monetary gain. This is what makes terrorism very unique. Since “cause” and
self-sacrifice are usually not sufficient to seize the attention of the whole world,
terrorists look for other elements such as innocent victims, horror, and, of crucial
importance, widespread exposure. If there were no media coverage, there would be
no terrorism. For this reason, this successful tactic will continue to be used by a
growing variety of people who feel abnormally strongly about their own particular
convictions and wish to gain worldwide publicity.

5.3 Maritime terrorism

Just as there is nothing new in the use of terrorism as a political weapon, so is there
nothing novel about it being used in the maritime environment. Terrorism in the
maritime environment is not a new phenomenon and arguably not a dramatically
growing one. Maritime terrorism has been an adjunct to political and quasi-military
campaigns for more than a century. The number of reported incidents demonstrates
some growth from decade to decade, not all of which is accounted for by better
reporting and analysis.
It can be defined by an equation stated by Thomas Schiller in “Violence at Sea”
(1986):
“Maritime terrorism = Attacks on ships or maritime installations by non-governmental groupings for
reasons other than immediate financial gain”

While the above definition is over simplified, it effectively screens out other forms of
violence in the maritime setting such as piracy, attacks by state operatives, and
attacks that take place during war

5.3.1 Why terrorists focus on the maritime environment

There are numerous reasons why terrorists would focus on the maritime
environment. Following are some of the main ones as Dr Jeffrey D. Simon put forth
in “Violence at Sea” (1986):
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-

Transport system are always vulnerable to terrorist attack, the threat against ships
is increased by the displacement of terrorist attack from the aviation system
where preventative security has reduced their opportunity for success.

-

The need to other targets than governmental assets as they became somewhat
routine, were they can use familiar tactics as bombings and hijackings, and also
develop new tactics such as the firing of under water missiles or detonation of
remote control devices at ports and on ships, to ensure that their actions receive
maximum publicity and to keep the general public as well as governments and
industry in a constant state of fear and uncertainty over the course of terrorism.

-

The vital link of the maritime environment with international commerce. Any
disruption with the former can paralyze a nation’s economy.

-

Passengers travelling by sea often feel vulnerable and that they are at the mercy
of elements, which make the ideal ingredients for a terrorist’s attack: an exciting
and potentially hazardous situation, innocent people in a vulnerable position, and
excellent communications.

For those reasons, the sea provides the perfect setting for a terrorist’s drama.

5.3.2 Background

Until recently, maritime terrorism has only been considered a major threat to
shipping and countries by thriller writers and a few farsighted individuals. It was not
until the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in October 1985 and its 800 passengers and
300 crewmembers, and the killing of an American citizen, that maritime terrorism
achieved any degree of international attention.
Since then, acts of maritime terrorist assaults have achieved unprecedented notoriety
and showed similarities to the Achille Lauro incident: the hijacking of a ship, the

57

murder of innocent people, and the publication of political statements. Unlike the
Achille Lauro incidents, however, most incidents pass without prosecution.

5.3.3 Terrorists: who they are

As Lt. Colonel F Mazzone noted in “Violence at Sea”(1986), “Terrorists may be
specially trained agents assigned to a specific mission. They may infiltrate a specific
segment of the maritime industry or work with a group near the port facility. They
are not necessarily foreign nationals or of foreign parentage. They may be highly
trained professionals or rank amateurs. They may be laborers, machinists, or
members of the crew.” Kenneth Gale Hawkes pointed in his book “Maritime
Security”(1998) that most of them are fanatics and some have even been mentally
deranged.

They are trained in physical conditioning, weaponry, electronics, communications,
explosives, camouflage, first aid, document forgery, martial arts, and military tactics.
Terrorists feed on problems of modern society without offering viable solution to the
problems. Since terrorists deal with problems perceived of society they tend to select
governments facilities or prominent individuals as their targets to attack.

5.3.3.1 How they act
Terrorists do not operate in a vacuum and they spend a lot of money on their
operations. Today’s terrorists are armed with automatic weapons, military
explosives, and sophisticated equipment, all of which they know how to use. Before
carrying out an action they must gather information about their target. This usually
involves surveillance and test runs.

“It is easy for the terrorists,” Professor Paul Wilkinson declared in “Violence at
Sea”(1986), “to pass themselves through ports, and harbors as tourists, passengers or
dock workers, and to gain access to vessels at the quay side. The more sophisticated
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and better-equipped groups can easily mount underwater operations against sitting
targets.”

“For non-passenger vessels,” B. A. H. Parritt expressed a tricky view in ‘Security at
Sea’(1991), “terrorists may attempt to seize the ship either by a ruse, e.g. by creating
a ‘ship in distress’ situation or by a rule of the road infringement which obliges the
ship to stop.” It is possible that the ship could be taken by armed force whilst in port,
although this is less likely.

5.3.3.2 The terrorist’s aim
Usually, terrorists select their targets very carefully, concentrating on those
conditions, which will be of the greatest political propaganda value to them and on
those situations, which assure them of a strong likelihood of success in the attack. In
‘Violence at Sea’, Paul Wilkinson has drawn attention to the fact that democracies
are clearly vulnerable to terrorist attacks because of the openness of their societies
and the ease of movement across and within frontiers.

Within the maritime industry there are three types of ocean-going vessels, which are
the most vulnerable to terrorist attack: passenger, tanker, and cargo ships. While all
ships, in port and at sea, risk being subjected to unlawful acts, passenger ships on
voyages lasting more than one day are potentially subject to the highest degree of
risk. Passenger vessels provide the biggest theatre for terrorists intent on taking
human life. Tanker ships carrying petroleum products provide for “spectacular”
terror through explosions or environmental damage. Cargo ships, while unable to
provide the kind of spectrum of violence usually desired by terrorists could still,
depending on its load and crew, offer a humanitarian appeal to the world.
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5.4 Preventive measures

Providing protection from acts of violence is the natural function of a military ship,
but it is a very unnatural function for a ship designed to provide relaxed holidays or
even to carry, peacefully, cargo from port to port. The preventative aspects of any
security program must come from within the industry; while the reactive response
must be the government’s responsibility acting at both the national and international
levels.

As it is said “what the Titanic did for safety, the Achille Lauro has done for
security,” the IMO recommendation for ship and port security against illegal act
became extremely influential and these ‘guidelines’ have been followed by national
legislation enacted by some countries, such as the USA, UK and Canada. As a
consequence, the role of merchant ships has been modified to include measures to
comply with IMO security standards. According to USCG revised Federal Register –
(33 CFR) the ship security plan for every passenger ship must be examined by the
National Maritime Center (NMC) 60 days before its arrival at any US port to ensure
that security standards are complied with on board that ship.

Reducing the threat of terrorism begins with the ability to evaluate the scope of the
problem. The objective of the security plan is to undertake a risk assessment of the
various targets that may be attractive to terrorists and suggest flexible and graduated
responses to match any change in the threat. The contingency plan and security
survey must be updated accordingly.

The security officer and master need to know what is the likelihood of a terrorist
attack, what is the probable nature of the attack, and how best to provide practical
protection. In this respect the ship need not to duplicate any security provisions
fulfilled by the terminal. When it comes to protection, priorities must be placed, with
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the protection of human life always being of first priority and with the protection of
property following afterwards.

In the light of the above function, the following actions must be emphasized and
serve as guidance:

-

Access control: It makes sense to try and prevent the potential terrorist from ever
getting as far as the ship. It is easier for the terrorist to board through an open
access than to launch an armed attack from shore or another ship. In the case of
an armed attack from outside, there will be a degree of public sympathy for the
ship as it is an unarmed commercial vessel and it is difficult for merchant seamen
to resist boarders firing machine guns. Conversely however, given the public
perception of security, if a terrorist manages to get on board by walking
unchecked up the gangway, or jumping through an unguarded bunker or
provisions station, it will be clear evidence that the standards of security on the
ship are poor, and the company and officers will be justifiably criticized.

-

The focus for passenger liner security has been, and must be, the passenger
terminals. The key to passenger liner security is access control. While cruise
ships can provide a limited amount of access control, the primary responsibility
for such security must rest with the port facility in which the passenger terminal
is situated. However, there must always be enough people of appropriate rank
and capability at each opening to maintain a proper watch, and if an access is not
being used – it has to be shut. For a commercial company the task of identifying
potential suspects is difficult due to the large number of passengers, visitors,
baggage handlers, ticket agents, food caterers and other services personnel found
in and around passenger terminal. For this reason, an identification card system is
required.
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-

A certain wireless channel should be used among ship’s crew ,only, in case of
breach of security. Also other channel should be established with terminal
security people while the ship berthed along side.

-

Lighting and alarm should be in order.

-

Electronic screening, hand held vapor detecting devices, metal detectors or other
means should be inspected before ship’s arrival.

-

Persons who refuse to be processed through an access point must be denied entry.
Persons denied entry for refusal to be processed, or for a security reason, should
be identified to appropriate security personnel.

-

When visitors are permitted to the ship, their embarkation and debarkation should
be closely controlled.

-

All vendors should have a positive photo identification document prior to
boarding the ship or should be escorted at all times on board the ship.

-

Ship security officer should develop a list of items prohibited from being brought
onboard ship. Prohibited items include at minimum weapons, explosives,
incendiaries and illegal drugs.

-

Concerning cargo, all of the following measures have to be taken such as
inspecting the cargo as it is loaded on board, checking out the designated
receivers of the shipments, checking out the shipping clerks of those companies
who regularly ship their loads with one particular agent, and storing suspicious
shipments in secure facilities for a period equal to the duration of the ship’s
cruise to its port of destination (if such a shipment was programmed to explode
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upon a specific ship at a designated time, it will explode in the warehouse during
the time it is being delayed and not on the targeted ship).

-

Restricted areas should be appropriately secured with the access limited to
authorized personnel. Each restricted area should be secured and conspiciously
marked stating that the area has restricted access.

5.5 Suspected passengers on board

In the Achille Lauro, the cabin staff was suspicious, but no one mentioned this
suspicion to the hotel director or captain, which was a big mistake. There are tell-tale
signs that could lead the ship’s crew to possible terrorists. As a guide, the ship’s
complement should be wary of any passenger who:
-

is found wandering around in those parts of the ship which passengers do not
formally frequent,

-

-is wandering around the ship decks at unusual hours or in unusual
circumstances,

-

remains in his cabin and does not come out for meals or recreation, but always
orders meals brought to his cabin,

-

supposedly does not know any other passengers but who maintains contact with
other “suspicious” passengers through signals or gestures at meetings in quiet
places on the ship, or groups who have identical items purchased in the same
place, such as valises of the same sort, hats of the same sort, etc.,

-

does not disembark in transit at the port of call en-route,

-

has purchased a ticket which seems incompatible with his means,

-

is either a single passenger or someone travelling in a small group (2-4 people)
between the ages of 18-40, including women,

-

is strangely dressed or who enters the dining room or lounge with items one does
not usually take to such places, such as large valises or wrapped packages.

63

5.6 Terrorists on board: intellectual consideration - ship’s staff reaction

It is recommended to try to establish what group of terrorists is involved. It is wrong
to seek or suggest to the hijacker, who may be no more than a stowaway, a drunken
or a drug crazed individual, that he may have financial demands or a specific
deadline. However, if the hijacker(s) is a terrorist, it is essential to know that:
- the adrenaline of the terrorists will be at a high level,
- at the start of the incident, they are likely to be very highly-strung and triggerhappy, they will wish to demonstrate that they intend to dominate the ship by
force,
- among the hijackers there could be a psychopath who is seeking an excuse to
kill, this excuse could be deliberately created or arise from a misunderstanding,
- they are unlikely to be fully aware of how a ship works or of any safety
requirements which might be associated with the cargo, and
-

they will be naturally suspicious about routine operations-even the simple
procedures for altering course.

In the light of this information, it is wise that captain and crew:

- ensure the safety of the ship in accordance with maritime practice,
- broadcast, if possible, a distress message,
- comply with the orders given by the terrorist,
-.consider that the establishment of a reasonable harmonious relationship between
hostages and captors is likely to reduce the chances of the terrorists acting
violently against their hostages,
- act normally, this can lower the tension of the terrorists,
- offer reasonable cooperation,
- never try to provoke them,
- never return abuse or aggression, and
-

always, try to reassure them that no subterfuge is being planned against them.
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It may appear at face value that this policy of complying with the terrorist is weak
and imaginative, it is in fact a planned strategy, which requires skill, patience and
courage. According to B. A. H. Parritt, the experience from all maritime attacks
proves that initial violent reaction to an armed terrorist is not only highly dangerous,
but also ineffective. The ship’s officer who runs to a safe and retrieves a pistol,
which he may not have fired for many years, is in a very vulnerable position.
Besides, there is always the risk of a passenger or a crewmember being shot. Another
factor making fire exchange not the wisest policy has to do with the ship being a part
of the sovereign territory of its flag and subject to the law of the country of register.
This country may have stringent laws regarding the use of firearms, and although the
ship may be sailing in international waters it could mean that an officer who shot a
terrorist would be liable to a charge of manslaughter or even murder.

It is essential to know what the terrorists’ demands are and what deadlines have been
set for meeting them. Demands may be passed by accomplices ashore and the current
incident may be linked with another elsewhere. At some stage in the incident a
confrontation between the terrorists and outside authorities is likely. Before this
confrontation, an opportunity may arise or may be created to pass information about
the hijackers. The authorities will surely want to know how many they are, their
descriptions, sex, how they are armed, how they deploy themselves, how they
communicate with each other, the language spoken and understood, their standard of
competence and their level of vigilance.

Wherever and whenever possible, Master should think in the idea that the hijackers
should be encouraged to surrender peacefully and should be discouraged from
mistreating either passengers or crew.

During the incident captain and crew will feel isolated, as they will be unaware of
steps being taken by their company/government on their behalf. This sense of
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isolation can lead to antagonism against their own authorities and sympathy for the
terrorists, unless those involved mentally prepare themselves against these feelings.

Following the incident, the master and his crew should avoid talking to the Press and
other media persons about the Government’s methods of resolving the incident.

The establishment of a secure, direct negotiation channel between the terrorists and
government negotiators is an essential step towards ending the incident successfully
and peacefully. Ideally, the master and his crew should avoid being directly involved
in the negotiations but, if forced to take part, should simply relay the dialogue back
and forth.
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CHAPTER 6

Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1 Conclusions

There are no simple solutions to dealing with any form of threats, and maritime
threat is no exception. There are however, measures that can be undertaken to make
responses more successful. Prevention is always better than cure. Every ship must
implement a system to prevent unlawful boarding and examine the preventive
measure necessary and the requirements for detailed security plan and contingency
plan to be held and implemented. This will include conduct of security survey,
control of access, designated restricted areas, establishment of secure area(s), and
training of the crew.

The activities of pirates and armed robbers now pose a real threat not only to those
on board ships but also to the territory and interests of coastal States through the
threat of a major pollution incident following an attack. Particular trouble spots are
the Far East and the South China Sea as well as South America ports. Typically,
most attacks occur under cover of darkness, with thieves using grappling hooks or
ropes to board vessels at anchor which represent the highest risk of attack, or when
underway by the aid of speed boats.
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Ships entering piratical areas should take appropriate measures to increase the level
of surveillance and security on board and to devise means of responding to attacks. A
clearly drafted anti–attack plan and the training of crews in security measures and
response techniques are essential. Education and measures to reduce this risks of
attack by restricting access to vessels at anchor offer the best means of ensuring a
vessel’s security and for cutting down the opportunities for boarders. Some key
security measures are to ensure that details of cargo carried, sailing routes and
schedules should remain confidential and to arrange voyage time so as to arrive in
port during daylight and either ensuring that a berth is vacant in advance, or “making
number” with the port to establish berth priority, then staying in deep water until the
berth becomes vacant.

When preparing to respond, or when responding to attacks, masters and crew should
seek to minimize the risk to those on board and seek to maintain effective control
over the safe navigation of the ship. In any balance that has to be struck between
resistance and safety, actions which secure the greatest level of safety, must be
preferred. Compliance with attackers’ demands is probably the best course, as
aggressive action could precipitate a more violent confrontation.

The problem of stowaway is an ancient one. During more recent times stowaways
have been regarded as an expensive nuisance primarily encountered by ships
operating in the third world. Due to rapidly changing economic and political
conditions stowaways have become a problem to ships in almost every sea. One
alarming trend has been the increase in the number of stowaways on a given ship.
Now groups that include women and children are being found. This trend reflects the
fact that stowing away on a merchant vessel is usually a group effort resulting from
shared know-how, bribery, collusion, and hard work. Unfortunately, the advance
guide of the stowaways are those people who are essential for the ship’s routine work
on port such as stevedores, guards, chandlers, and customs official. By training crew
in basic security proceedings and making them aware of the areas where stowaways
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will attempt to board vessels, and educating them about where stowaways will
secrete themselves once on board, the risk of individuals successfully boarding may
be reduced. However, the achievement of total stowaway prevention and detection
still largely depends on the adequately and capability of the crew.

The threat of terrorism against ships is increased by the displacement of terrorist
attacks from the aviation system where preventive security has reduced their
opportunities for success. Terrorists are unpredictable. Every ship must be
considered a potential target for terrorist attack. So, to be effective, overall security
for ship operations has to be strengthened.

Experience has taught us that terrorists will carefully plan and seek out opportunities
to exploit weaknesses in security measures to achieve their goals. For this reason,
strict discipline in security awareness must be insisted upon in order for security
measures to have their effect. It includes knowing how they act, implementing
preventive measures, recognizing suspected passengers and apprehending and
training on the crew member’s reaction in case of terrorists gain control. On the
assumption that acts of terrorism are going to continue, companies and ships now
have to look at security requirements as a routine part of running ships. Ten years
ago, failure to implement adequate security was an act of irresponsibility. Now,
failure to implement adequate security is a failure of standard ship management.
Fortunately, the IMO Guidelines to Prevent Illegal Acts at Sea have been agreed to
help ship managers and masters decide what is an appropriate level of protection.
6.2 Recommendations
The author recommends that the proposed measures already brought forward in each
of the chapters on piracy, stowaways, and terrorism be incorporated in a set of
guidelines for distribution to Egyptian ships by the Egyptian MARAD in cooperation
with shipowners. In addition, the author wishes to make the following additional
recommendations:
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•

Although, throughout the International Safety Management (ISM) code the
word “Security” is never mentioned, section 2.2 of the code emphasizes that
general safety management objectives should be “to establish safeguards against
all identified risk.” It is now inconceivable that the problems of piracy,
stowaway, and terrorism should not be accepted as coming under that definition
of ‘identified risks’. Along this context, companies should, as a fundamental
element of Safety Management System (SMS), design, reflect, and maintain the
security measures on board ships. Accordingly, the Egyptian MARAD, while
issuing the Safety Management Certificate, must ensure that Egyptian ships
comply with security measures and is obliged to enforce them as part of their
overall compliance with ISM Code.

•

Merchant shipping companies must be required to audit the preventive
practical guidance against crimes aboard ship and how these procedures are
followed by ship’s crew. Seafarers should face appropriate penalties or
administrative action if it is proven that they have failed to exercise due
diligence.

•

As much as knowledge is power, the more knowledge seafarers have about
threats, the better equipped they will be to combat them. Therefore, to enhance
their knowledge and to transmit the means of security measures on board ships,
the maritime education and training institutes should be encouraged to develop
modules or courses on practical shipboard security for seafarers. The program
could be in the form of a short course developed through an analysis of the tasks
involved and an evaluation of associated risks. Form this point of view, this
author believes that the Arab Academy for Science and Technology & Maritime
Transport (AAST & MT), a regional maritime institute based in Egypt, can take
charge of promoting and delivering this recommended course for Egyptian
seafarers.
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•

The Egyptian MARAD should require masters of Egyptian ships to hold
training sessions for the officers and crew to ensure the proper application of the
security measures on board the ship.

•

The Egyptian MARAD should encourage masters to report on all securityrelated incidents which have occurred on board Egyptian-flagged ships. Detailed
descriptions of the incident with the resulting failure or deficient security
measure, if any, should be reported so that security plans on board other Egyptian
vessels may be upgraded or modified accordingly.

•

Establishment of a coordinated security system between ships and ports of
call. Prior to the arrival of the ship to the port, the ship security officer should
make every effort to obtain from the local law enforcement or port security
officer an updated threat assessment for the port. Copies of the vessel security
plan should be provided to the port security officer prior to the ship’s calling on
the port. This will allow the port security officer to review the ship’s security
plan. Once the vessel arrives, the ship security officer should ensure that
preventive measures are already in place at the port.

•

Egyptian MARAD should, in connection with port authorities, establish a
security program designed to control the physical access to the ports as well as
access to information in its storage facilities, waterways and services. The
improvement of ship-to-shore communications is very important especially since
negligence in this field frequently contributes to increasing the risk.

•

The awareness of potentially violent maritime threats such as piracy and
stowaways must be heightened on a worldwide basis. Shipping companies should
frequently share their own experiences with such problems in global fora, such as
the Internet, in the hope that these details will eventually be used to advise other
companies and governments of the magnitude of the problems facing the
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industry. The Egyptian MARAD should publish incidents reported on Egyptian
ships and offer suggestions on how to deal with such situations.
•

Masters should take advantage of data base technology which provides a
growing numbers of information of maritime threats that are becoming more
freely available and that highlight the prevention and detection process.

•

Every space on board ship should be kept locked in port as this reduces the
number of locations that can be used to hide stowaways (or a terrorist’s bomb) or
from which goods can be stolen. It also limits the scope for sabotage. Though a
lock is not an absolute barrier against a determined assault, it is effective against
most criminal visitors who would not like their actions to be detected
immediately. There is often a natural reluctance to keep doors always locked on a
ship, and unless there is firm supervision by the OOW on his regular patrols, they
will be left open. The standard of locking on a ship is directly related to the
standards of discipline on board the ship.

•

Unidentified stevedores, salesmen, prostitutes and all persons with no
legitimate business aboard ship should not, in any case, be allowed to embark the
ship. The golden rule must always be that no unauthorized visitors should be
permitted access to the ship.

•

It is essential that ships likely to find themselves in any risk area should have a
contingency plan appropriate to the circumstances and that every crew member
should know and understand both the general principles of the plan as well as the
details that affect them. Equally essential is the necessity for total discipline
before, during and after any attack. One maverick within the crew can completely
destroy the effectiveness of any plan.
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•

Some shipowners and masters do not cooperate in making investigation
possible because of the tight schedules of ships as they cannot afford to wait in
port while crew members testify. In order to improve the accuracy of the
statistics, shipmasters and shipowners could be assured that no undue or
unjustifiable delay of their vessels would result when reports of piracy are
submitted to the appropriate authorities. For this reason, investigation teams in
the Egyptian MARAD must be well qualified, very quick and accurate to
guarantee minimum delay to the ship. Only this can encourage masters and
shipowners to report the occurrence of attacks.

•

According to its classical definition, piracy (UNCLOS 1982) is a crime that
occurs on the high seas. Today’s reality shows, however, that pirates plunder,
maim and kill with impunity in the territorial seas of many countries. The
majority of attacks today in fact occurs within territorial waters and therfore falls
outside the UNCLOS definition of piracy. The IMB has updated the definition by
stating that “Piracy is an act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit
theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the
furtherance of that act.” The author recommends that the Egyptian MARAD
adopt IMB’s definition of piracy, or a version thereof, as its own official
definition in order to reflect the reality obtaining in the world’s seas today.

•

The Egyptian Government should support and encourage the harmonization of
international procedures to help address current discrepancies connected with
prosecuting piratical acts around the world. Egypt should support any proposal
made by concerned nations calling for an international convention on the
prevention of piracy, stowaways and terrorism.

•

As an important step towards solving the difficult problems connected with
the stowaways who gain access to ships, the Egyptian MARAD should amend
regulations to allow the issuance of legally binding rules on shipowner’s and
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master’s responsibilities in relation to stowaways. Such rules could be established
on the basis of IMO resolution A. 871(20) “ Guidelines on the allocation of
responsibilities to seek the successful resolution of stowaways cases.” In
addition, stowaways should officially be treated as criminal offenders so as to
completely take away the romantic or adventurous notions associated with it and
to more effectively deter would-be illegal passengers.
•

Since the Egyptian maritime industry does not possess neither the resources
nor the capabilities to design and implement its own intelligence network, the
Egyptian government should, in cooperation with other governments and
agencies, establish an intelligence-sharing network designed to forecast the
likelihood of future terrorist incidents. Just as good security can be thought of the
last line of defense against terrorists, good intelligence is a vital first line of
defence.

Even though the above recommendations are made for Egyptian ships, this author is
confident that other flags will find them useful since violence crimes at sea do not
discriminate against nationality, race, or creed. Maritime administrations should not
wait for violent crimes to take place before instituting even the most basic security
measures. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
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